Sticking to their Guns: The Missing RMA for Cybersecurity by Tabansky, Lior
Military Cyber Affairs
The Journal of the Military Cyber Professionals Association
ISSN: 2378-0789
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 3
2018
Sticking to their Guns: The Missing RMA for
Cybersecurity
Lior Tabansky
The Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center, Tel Aviv University, cyber.ac.il@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca
Part of the International Relations Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Military Cyber Affairs by an
authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tabansky, Lior (2018) "Sticking to their Guns: The Missing RMA for Cybersecurity," Military Cyber Affairs: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/2378-0789.3.1.1039
Available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol3/iss1/3
Sticking to their Guns: The Missing RMA for Cybersecurity
Cover Page Footnote
This research was partially supported by a grant from the Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center
(ICRC) at Tel Aviv University (TAU). The paper presents the author's personal opinion.
This article is available in Military Cyber Affairs: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol3/iss1/3
1 
Sticking to their Guns: The Missing RMA for 
Cybersecurity1 
Lior Tabansky2 
 
Abstract: Why has cybered conflict disrupted the security of the most developed nations? A 
foreign adversary contemplating an attack on a developed nation's heartland certainly faces 
multiple state-run military-grade lines of defense on land, sea and air. A foreign adversary 
launching a direct cyber-attack on a non-military homeland target will meet none. Armed forces 
do not shield a society from cyber-attacks originated by foreign adversaries, no longer provide a 
buffer between the enemy and homeland, nor can they identify the attacker after an attack occurred.  
Adversaries succeed in waging cybered conflict against the U.S. and its allies. Having 
repeatedly inflicted economic and social harm while evading retaliation, adversaries become 
brazen. To prevail in cybered conflict, we need to return to the very foundations of our defense.  
However, profound defense adaptation is especially problematic for dominant militaries. 
To develop my argument, I turn to analyze a Stuxnet-like scenario using the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA) concept of Security Studies and the paradigm shift concept of philosophy of 
science. Security Studies theory, philosophy of science and empirical evidence all suggest that 
profound defense adaptation demands pressure from outside the expert organization. I argue that 
Security Studies theory and empirical evidence, including Israel’s defense adaptation following 
short-range rocket threat, suggest that civilian outsiders coalescing with military partners can 
successfully drive defense adaptation.  
To secure the Western world order, the U.S. and its allies need to rearrange their security 
forces, leveraging the experience accumulated through centuries. 
  
                                                 
1 Please cite as: Tabansky, Lior, “Sticking to their Guns: The Missing RMA for Cybersecurity,” in Demchak, Chris 
and Benjamin Schechter, eds. Military Cyber Affairs: Cyber, Economics, and National Security 3, no. 1 (2018). 
2 Scholar of cyber power at Tel Aviv University's Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center (TAU ICRC) 
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Cyberwarfare is Raging in the Homeland 
Chinese bulk espionage and its heavy economic toll has long been the main cybered threat 
to the U.S. (Brenner & Lindsay, 2015; Cheung, 2009; McConnell, Chertoff, & Lynn, 2012). In 
2010, a direct destructive cyber-attack on computerized Industrial Control Systems (ICS) at a 
hardened homeland target became a reality (Demchak & Dombrowski, 2011; Denning, 2012; 
Zetter, 2014). Ransomware has crippled numerous devices and networks in small business and 
homes ("Verizon report shows business is booming for cyber-criminals," 2017). Foreign state-
sponsored adversaries have successfully carried out politically-motivated attacks against civilian 
targets in the U.S., including Sony Pictures Entertainment (Sharp, 2017) and Sands Casinos (The 
Australian Strategic Policy, 2015). Hostile cybered influence operations targeting the democratic 
process have recently emerged on the cybered conflict agenda (Kragh & Åsberg, 2017; Kramer & 
Wentz, 2008; Tabansky, 2017). Cyberwarfare is raging at homeland: cyber-attacks have hit power 
production, financial services, numerous industries and political processes. 
Despite decades of threat awareness, leading technology, superior budgets and capability 
development, the residual cyber risk to developed nations has skyrocketed. The U.S. Director of 
National Intelligence has ranked cyber as the top national security risk since 2014, taking over the 
top spot held by terrorism post- 9/11. Why have cybered threats disrupted the security of the most 
developed nations? I argue that armed forces have failed to adapt strategically to cybered conflict. 
Ministries of defense and militaries are bystanders in raging cyberwarfare. This profound national 
cyber insecurity in the leading states demands scrutiny. 
First, I develop the analysis with the fundamental strategic theory guiding every sovereign 
defense. Using a Stuxnet-like scenario I show how cybered conflict challenges the very 
fundamentals that we grew accustomed to and treat as axioms. Having established the need for 
profound defense adaptation, I review the studies of maladaptation – two in the United State and 
one in Israel -- to stress that obstacles to defense adaptation are conceptual rather than technical. I 
conclude with a discussion of how to facilitate profound change by presenting and analyzing one 
recent successful innovation in Israel's defense. 
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Where We Are: Armed forces vs Stuxnet-like attacks in the US and Israel 
To put a comfortable excuse to rest, cybersecurity is not new to the Western defense 
community. The quarter-century-old U.S. National Research Council report reads as if it were 
written today: 
We are at risk. Increasingly, America depends on computers. They control 
power delivery, communications, aviation and financial services. They are 
used to store vital information, from medical records to business plans to 
criminal records. Although we trust them, they are vulnerable – to the 
effects of poor design and insufficient quality control, to accident, and 
perhaps most alarmingly, to deliberate attack ((U.S.)., Board., & System 
Security Study Committee., 1991). 
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 (PDD-63) of 1998 set the ability to protect the 
nation’s cyber-physical systems (CPS) in critical infrastructure from intentional attacks (both 
physical and cyber) by the year 2003 as a national goal. The scenario has become real: 
The 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy reiterated the fact that foreign states attack the 
U.S. homeland targets in cyber: 
Our economy, safety, and health are linked through a networked 
infrastructure that is targeted by malicious government, criminal, and 
individual actors who try to avoid attribution. Drawing on the voluntary 
cybersecurity framework, we are securing Federal networks and working 
with the private sector, civil society, and other stakeholders to strengthen 
the security and resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure United and 
President, "National Security Strategy," (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 2015). pp. 12-13, Emphasis added. 
However, the U.S. federal response outside of the Department of Defense (DOD) remains 
light, indirect and self-constrained to voluntary action. U.S. military forces now prepare to fight in 
five domains: land, sea, air, space and cyber. To address the national security implications of 
cyberspace, the DOD has identified cyberspace in military strategy and doctrine as an operational 
domain in which to organize, train and equip forces to ensure it has the necessary capabilities to 
operate effectively across all operational domains of warfare.  
Notably however, the DoD plays a supporting role to the DHS. The DoD only steps into 
Critical Infrastructure Protection action after a severe incident has occurred, caused damage and 
3
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has been identified. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is the process by which the 
DOD may provide support through the federal military force, National Guard, and other resources 
in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies (e.g., 
hurricanes and wildfires), special events (e.g., political party national conventions), designated 
law-enforcement support and other domestic activities. The National Response Framework (NRF) 
outlines a tiered process in which incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level, 
providing a process for a state governor to request assistance from the President prior to DoD 
involvement.  Only if directed by the President or SecDef (likely following a state-level request), 
the DoD may be required to bring its immense capabilities to conduct Cyber-DSCA. 
In Israel, the recognition of cyber risks and threats to civilian cyber-physical systems came 
later than in the U.S. With an understanding of civilian infrastructure and cyber-vulnerabilities 
garnered from decades of defense experience, in the late 1990’s defense leaders communicated 
cybersecurity concerns to the civilian government. These concerns are today referred to as risks to 
CPS. Quoting the key person involved: 
In the mid-1990s we in the defense community were looking for suitable targets for 
cyber exploitation around us [Israel]. Quickly we realized that by far the largest set 
of targets exists – but it is Israel.3 
The head of MAF’AT (the Ministry of Defense Directorate for Defense Research & 
Development, DDR&D) at that time personally took the initiative to address the government on 
several occasions, raising the issue of new society-wide vulnerabilities for the first time. However, 
the Israeli policy response differed markedly from the U.S., as the state accepted much higher role 
in defending the civilian sector. By the end of 2002, the efforts to develop a national Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) arrangement culminated in Government of Israel Special 
Resolution B/84 on ‘the responsibility for protecting computerized systems in the State of Israel.’ 
Notable in the 2002 resolution is that what today is referred to as ‘cyberspace’ was not viewed as 
a virtual environment, or as an independent area of operation. The subject of protection - 
‘computerized information systems’ - were defined as being interconnected with physical realms. 
Moreover, an ‘information’ system differentiates from a ‘control’ system in both concept and 
practice. An information system ‘performs automated activities of input reception, processing, 
                                                 
3 Personal interview with B., Tel Aviv 2014 
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storage, processing and transmission of information.’ A control and supervision system, on the 
other hand, is ‘a computer-integrated system that controls and supervises the frequency and 
regulation of measurable activities, carried out by mechanized means within the information 
system itself.’4 
The defense sector - especially some specific IDF units - had leading IT-security expertise. 
But Israel also rejected a military-centered cyber CIP approach. Designating responsibility for 
protection of vital computerized systems of civilian bodies to the military in peacetime would 
create an immense ethical and legal problem for the Israeli democracy. Moreover, given the 
technical characteristics, delineation of domestic versus foreign ceased to be clear.  
In the U.S. and in Israel, the cybered threats to the homeland continued to grow and 
materialize in various ways. In response, the ministries of defense and armed forces led the 
development of human capital, technology and doctrine, even running offensive operations in 
cyberspace. However, none of the ministries of defense and armed forces have been tasked with 
the leading CIP role, nor a bigger role in protecting the respective societies. The U.S. upholds the 
voluntary approach to Critical Infrastructure Protection, and the DoD's vast resources can only be 
utilized after disaster strikes. Despite Israel's state-led defense of Critical Infrastructure and 
cyberspace in general, Israel does not utilize the MoD's or IDF's expertise and vast resources for 
these tasks. 
The common cyber defense position is that armed forces cannot be responsible for 
defending society from cyber-attacks on strategic non-military homeland targets by foreign 
adversaries. National cybersecurity tasks and associated practices require a presence in domestic 
networks, while existing laws prohibit the armed forces from domestic operations. Armed forces 
have been adapting to cybered conflict: navies seek to leverage new technologies to improve the 
effectiveness in the seas; air forces do the same in the air, and so forth. The doctrine remains largely 
intact, with cyber technology playing only a supporting role to existing concepts of operations. 
This kind of adaptation is not only rational but also required by the applicable laws.  
                                                 
4 (Tabansky, 2013) 
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I argue that the defense adaptation that has been progressing is in fact misguided. I do not 
refer to the pace of change, nor to resource allocation. The main problem is the misguided direction 
of change, as it has neglected the drastic transformations brought on by cybered conflict. 
To understand the challenges of cybered conflict, we need to drill down deeper than usual 
with regard to defense adaptation.  To develop my argument, I turn to analyze a Stuxnet-like 
scenario using the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) concept of Security Studies and the 
paradigm shift concept of philosophy of science. 
Winning the next war? The Fundamental Strategic Theory Challenge 
The guiding strategic assumptions of national defense have been formed as a result of 
decades and centuries of experience in war. In every modern state armed forces play the central 
role in defending the nation against foreign adversaries. As Demchak and Dombrowski wrote in 
2011: 
Most nations make a distinction between the forces defending the borders from 
attack (militaries) and those protecting the individual citizens inside the nation from 
attack (police). This distinction is one of the direct outcomes of the rise of the 
modern state from the Westphalian Peace. But it is severely challenged by the 
unfettered character of the current global cyberspace topology. Today militaries, 
police, and intelligence organizations in particular have been challenged both by 
the attacks and by the jurisdictional lack of clarity in obligations and ability to 
demand resources. Both state and nonstate competitors have used the 
interconnectivity inherent to the web to attack and disrupt operations and gather 
intelligence about capabilities and intentions across borders with impunity. 
(Demchak & Dombrowski, 2011) p. 43 
Across the strategic security studies literature and lessons from history, one can argue that 
a ‘fundamental strategic theory’5 lies behind every sovereign defense strategy and relies directly 
on the armed forces performing both defense and deterrence missions in protecting the state.  The 
following set of axioms and corollaries summaries and capture what are the key elements of these 
two missions.  Armed forces are expected to:  
1. Defend and fight when hostilities have erupted: armed forces defend the nation’s 
society, economy and citizenry from harm:  
                                                 
5 This summary is the author’s own. 
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a. Prevent the enemy force (soldiers and weaponry) from reaching the nation’s 
homeland as demarcated by borders. 
b.  Sustain the bulk of damage, while the citizens are safer at homeland. Military 
units maneuver and fight on a battlefield, preferably not within own borders. 
c. Buffer between the enemy and society: borders, barriers, forward deployment, 
conquest of enemy territory to push back farther than the effective range (e.g. 
Israel-Lebanon 1982 war, 40km range)  
2. Deter hostilities: armed forces deter the enemy so that hostilities do not erupt at all or 
do not escalate: 
a. Assess adversarial intent and capabilities through intelligence services and in 
collaboration with other defense agencies. 
b. Identify swiftly and reliably the attacker(s) responsible for the attack. 
c. Engage in battle to punish the attacker(s) responsible for the attack to 
demonstrate will and capability in order to deter further attacks and other 
would-be attackers. 
While the list above should appear straightforward to the reader, cybersecurity poses 
particularly difficult challenges for defense and deterrence in national security.   The U.S. armed 
forces and the Israel Defense Force (IDF) are well aware of the fact that each war will play out 
differently from the last one. Efforts to think about how the next conflict will play out and what 
needs to be done to prevail are evident across both forces, but so far these efforts have fallen short 
of what is needed. 
The Missing Cyber RMA in the West 
Security Studies scholars have long researched changes in militaries and the historical 
conditions of victory and defeat. The Security Studies “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) 
concept developed separately from the original Kuhn definition of a changing paradigm6, but the 
                                                 
6 The Security Studies scholarship on military innovation and Kuhn's seminal study of scientific communities 
independently reach very similar findings: the obstacles to defense adaptation are conceptual and organizational 
rather than technical. I turn to focus on just one aspect: the significance of professional expertise. 
In science, a paradigm refers to universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model 
problems and solutions for a community of practitioners. A paradigm represents a set of "concrete puzzle solutions" 
which the associated community employs as "models or examples" to "replace explicit rules as a basis for solutions 
of the remaining puzzles of normal science.”  
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RMAis defined as a paradigm shift in military operations that obsolesces one or more core 
competencies of a dominant player or creates one or more new core competencies. (Hundley, 
1999) Many historical RMAs came as the result of a military organization applying new 
technologies coupled with innovative operational concepts to gain new competencies. With these 
new competencies, armed forces achieved operational goals in a new manner that rendered their 
opponents’ defenses obsolete. Historical evidence shows how a normal period of defense may be 
periodically punctured by revolutionary outcomes such as one-sided victories achieved when one 
force renders opponents’ defenses obsolete. These RMAs usually occur after building upon long 
periods of peacetime defense adaptation.  
Today this adaptation process can be studied in near real-time. A successful and direct 
destructive cyber-attack on civilian critical infrastructure, for example, meets the definition of an 
RMA. In this case, it is the success in the application of new technologies - with innovative 
operational concepts and organizational adaptation to gain new competencies that demonstrates 
the RMA capable of achieving operational goals in a new manner that renders existing defense 
systems obsolete such an attack is a genuine threat, as proven with the discovery of Stuxnet 
in 2010. 
                                                 
Kuhn introduced the concept "paradigm shift" to describe a fundamental change in the basic concepts and experimental 
practices of a scientific discipline. Kuhn contrasted these shifts to normal science, which he described as scientific 
work done within a prevailing framework (or paradigm). Similarly, normal defense works well when the basics of 
the discipline remain unchallenged by a growing number of anomalies. Overall, we trust expertise. Bureaucracies 
are often the center of expertise on their respective topics by virtue of design and resources. For cybersecurity, most 
mature organizations still turn to their IT departments for solutions. Militaries, and their various armed services, are 
the bureaucracy experts: Generals are best equipped to manage armed conflict; Admirals would be the experts of 
choice in Naval warfare.  
This straightforward confidence in expertise is fine when things are normal. Most would prefer that their problems be 
taken care by experts rather than visionaries. However, during periods of profound change, expertise may become 
an obstacle to adaptation. The philosophy and sociology of science - as well as empirical studies of organizational 
change in business and defense - explain why challenges to accepted views are more likely to come from sources 
outside the dominant system. Experts are those who have the strongest credentials under an existing paradigm, 
however, these also tend to be credentialed by a system that has arisen from the existing paradigm. That is, their 
status as experts is not independent of the theory, but is a product of the theory’s success to date (Hill & Gerras, 
2016).  
As Thomas Kuhn writes: 
Almost always the men who achieve these fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young or very new to 
the field whose paradigm they change (Kuhn, 1962). 
Those we trust the most as experts are the least likely to recognize and identify anomalies, for the very reason that 
they are within the system.  In armed forces, where the costs of failure can be catastrophic, bureaucracy is even less 
open to challenge. With experts who have not only professional authority, resources and prestige but also the power 
to command directly, the costs of subordinates questioning their expertise are prohibitive. 
8
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Adversarial challenges coupled with misguided defense adaptation have repeatedly created 
conditions where defense has been rendered obsolete. The same situation has been unfolding in 
the last decade. In Table 1, a cyber RMA’s catalyzing conditions are identified. 
TABLE 1 THE CYBER-RMA SCENARIO 
Newly possible 
method 
Core competency rendered 
obsolete 
Player affected 
 Destructive 
direct cyber-attack on 
strategic non-military 
homeland targets by 
foreign adversaries 
 Defense: perimeter 
protection, preventing enemy access 
to strategic targets at homeland 
 Deterrence: establish 
attackers' identity to deliver 
punishment 
 All 
developed modern 
societies, with their 
respective defenses 
 
A direct, destructive cyber-attack on civilian critical infrastructure breaks the fundamental 
strategic theory guiding every sovereign defense. As opposed to other types of attacks, cyber-
attacks on computerized Industrial Control Systems (ICS) operating civilian critical infrastructure 
can reach strategic homeland targets without encountering nation-grade defenders. Foreign 
adversaries contemplating a destructive attack on a homeland target in a developed nation certainly 
face multiple state-run military-grade lines of defense on land, sea and air. This is in fact the main 
reason for the high level of security that citizens of Western countries enjoy: adversaries opt not 
to engage in warfare they are likely to lose.  
However, cybered conflict has exposed a profound organizational vulnerability of 
westernized nations. It highlights the failure to produce a cyber RMA in order to defend as 
expected by the fundamental strategic theory of deterrence. At best, commercial-grade and profit-
oriented technological solutions stand between a Stuxnet-like attack and homeland targets. Unlike 
most of history, militaries are not directly involved in protecting critical infrastructure or the 
homeland at large from strategic attacks. Foreign adversaries launching a direct, destructive cyber-
attack on a non-military homeland target in the U.S. or Israel will not encounter defenses by the 
superior military forces. Armed forces do not shield society from cyber-attacks.  
9
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Moreover, the cyber attribution problem also profoundly undermines deterrence in the 
current socio-technical-economic system’s architecture. While by no means is this attribution 
problem inherent in the technology, it is the result of architectural choices made in TCP/IP & 
Internet reinforced by market incentives. These inherent design characteristics are not easy to 
change. With the growth in the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industry 4.0, the attack surface 
available to adversaries expands, presenting even more lucrative targets and readily 
employedattack vectors.  
Peacetime Strategic Maladaptation 
Maladaptation almost never manifests in total unawareness of a changing reality, and 
western defenses are far from denying the major challenges of cyber. Militaries, intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies welcome the notion of adopting cyber technology to improve execution 
of existing strategies, increase efficiencies and improve core capabilities. How do armed forces 
today use their cyber warfare capabilities? Defense organizations universally do their own 
cybersecurity: namely, protect their own existing assets and capabilities. Each of the military 
branches knows what it does, and is determined to continue to do those things with help of new 
technology. This is tactical defense adaptation to cyber. 
In militaries, as in any other professional bureaucracy or knowledge discipline, experts are 
accustomed to the existing fundamentals. Experts naturalize the rules of the game so that these 
fundamentals are removed from the scope of debate. Within professional communities - in science 
and in defense - experts are repeatedly taught the core professional principles throughout their 
career development. The core principles that lie at the heart of their theories become deeply 
embedded into the dominant paradigm, akin to axioms or laws of nature, never to be questioned. 
To challenge the core principles that lie at the heart of our theories is no simple task; to do so 
induces stiff expert opposition. The difficulty is that a profound change requires such a challenge.  
One typical challenge is a war - a natural test that exposes many likely surprising obstacles 
and the risks of suffering a loss. Clearly, this is not a good option for U.S. or Israeli stakeholders. 
Another and less painful type of challenge emerges from intellectual and political efforts external 
to the military and outside of war, perhaps in efforts to avoid one.. For the purpose of this paper, 
a bird's eye overview of three peacetime strategic maladaptation cases will suffice to illustrate the 
10
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weight of internal expertise in preventing paradigm shifts. Among the telling cases which military 
innovation scholars have analyzed are the U.S. Army aviation revival, the Royal Navy failure to 
protect commercial shipping, and the IDF’s initial refusal to adopt nontraditional responses to the 
rocket threat to Israel. (Griffin, 2017). For the example of civilian-led challenge and then 
adaptation, I turn to develop an additional recent case study: Israel Defense Forces' doctrine versus 
short-range rockets and missiles.  
U.S. Army aviation revival after World War II 
During its formation as a stand-alone service in 1947, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
aggressively argued for a central role in winning the next war by declaring its strategic application 
of airpower couldwin the war by itself. The USAF possessed institutional and professional 
expertise, a certain degree of institutionalized independence, and the freedom to build the forces 
in accordance with its own vision.  
The U.S. Army, however, required air support for most of its land missions. The mandate 
to operate aerial power, as well as the capability, now rested with the USAF in managing the 
dissonance between two different missions, force structures, organizations and capabilities, the 
USAF mostly renounced the need to fly combat support missions for the Army. The US 
Department of Defense (DOD), which houses the civilian oversight of the Armed Forces, was 
unable to optimize the Air Force’s role as the single air service across the services.  
In particular, the U.S. Army engaged in elaborate forms of resistance, culminating in a very 
peculiar outcome. Eventually, in direct denial of the top-level political decision for USAF 
"owning" the air domain, the Army was able to acquire, operate, and maintain its own parallel air 
force (Bergerson, 1978). While fix-winged aircraft remained a USAF monopoly, the U.S. Army 
developed rotary-wing aerial firepower, i.e. helicopters armed with guns, rockets, and missiles 
(Bradin, 1994).  
In this case, the Army's achievements show how sustained actions of "bureaucratic 
insurgents" – activist reformers who oppose policy yet work to change it from inside the 
organization – can produce highly disrupting results. In current context, the point here is that the 
USAF - as an armed forces branch owning a domain - was able to decide what defense roles it 
would not play. Its assumption of expertise and disdain of contrary paradigms left the other service 
11
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to scramble to meet the otherwise abandoned close air support needs from the domain it technically 
did not ‘own’ nor had expertise.. The USAF position was legitimated in large part due to the 
paradigm its experts held about what an Air Force did and did not do 
Royal Navy Failure to Protect Commercial Shipping in WWI and WWII  
The Royal Navy long enjoyed dominance of the world's ocean. The credit for its past 
success cemented the Navy's expertise in maritime defense. Unrestricted submarine warfare 
against commercial shipping was a very serious threat strategic to Britain in WWII. The German 
U-Boat threat already manifested on a smaller scale in WWI: U-Boats exposed the vulnerability 
of merchant shipping, on which the UK economy depended. In fact, U-Boats caused damages 
exceeded the Navy's expectations in WWI. (Herwig, 1996) 
The UK antisubmarine division of the naval staff did analyze the submarine experience 
from World War I.  Its findings appeared in a technical history series shortly after 1918. Yet the 
Admiralty classified the volumes, making them inaccessible to most officers rising through the 
ranks; moreover, in 1939 it then declared them obsolete and destroyed them. Advocacy for 
antisubmarine warfare often resulted in the termination of one's career. Britain's naval doctrine, 
developed largely by the Admiralty experts, resisted changes requiring the shifting of resources to 
counter U-Boats. Traditional service beliefs operated against learning the lessons of I9I7-I9I8. The 
Royal Navy discounted the submarine menace and passed the threat on to the air staff for 
resolution. But the Royal Air Force (RAF), which had control of virtually all air assets throughout 
the interwar period, proved even more disinterested in antisubmarine warfare at high sea (Herwig, 
1996). In retrospect, air power advocates grossly exaggerated the airplane's role as a submarine 
killer. Royal Navy stubborn tenacity not to protect British merchant shipping is another example 
of a branch of armed forces owning a domain, and cherry-picking what parts of that domain it will 
accept as its responsibility. 
In Kuhn's terms, submarine warfare against commercial shipping was an anomaly that 
normal science (which gave primacy to surface vessels) could not explain. The established Royal 
Navy bureaucracy used its weight of expertise to keep its preferred vision of victory and doctrine 
tied to battleships and major fleet engagements, costing the nation extraordinary amounts of lives 
and treasures when the war began. 
12
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Moreover, this maladaptation was not exclusively British. Between the World Wars, the 
navies of Britain, Germany and the U.S. all disregarded convoy protection and antisubmarine 
work. 
 In terms of an overarching doctrinal framework, the major naval establishments 
were united in the belief that submarines could never constitute true sea power and 
exercise either sea control or sea denial. This staunch orthodoxy worked to block 
innovation (Herwig, 1996). 
Israel's doctrine versus short-range rockets and missiles  
Since 1969, the short-range rocket threat to Israel's homeland from the Northern border has 
been persistent. In 2001, it also materialized from the Gaza Strip in the South.7 As most of these 
rocket attacks caused no significant damage, the IDF routinely disregarded the strategic and 
psychological aspects. While the military effectiveness of this threat was low in comparison with 
other kinetic options, it markedly showed that the IDF did not protect the homeland. From the 
1970’s to the 2000’s, the IDF was drawn into recurrent conventional military operations to "purge" 
areas from rockets and thus to protect the nation from the short-range rocket threat.  
Arguably, the recurrent IDF missions had operational success. But they also incurred heavy 
strategic costs. The 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee escalated into the First Lebanon War 8 The 
IDF's 1985 withdrawal to a Security Zone - and the subsequent military occupation of South 
Lebanon to create a buffer zone - exerted a heavy toll on Israel. The rise of Hezbollah and Shi'a 
dominance in South Lebanon cannot be explained and understood without examining the First 
Lebanon War. The IDF's May 2000 unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon and the collapse of the 
Lebanese Christian South Lebanese Army may have signaled a certain weakness in Israel's 
willingness to defend itself.  
With the IDF playing a dominant role in Israel's security policy, the military experts chose 
to disregard the "flying tubes." The IDF contributed to overconfidence in Israel's deterrent.  One 
senior expert demonstrated the mindset proclaiming Hezbollah's rocket arsenal will “rust” in 
                                                 
7 As most of these did no material damage, the strategic and psychological aspects were routinely disregarded by the 
IDF. 
8 It started in large part to prevent bombardment on citizens of Northern Israel. The official Operation Peace for Galilee 
goal was to push the threat beyond the effective rocket range of 40 kilometers. 
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Lebanon warehouses.9 This determined the low priority in developing countermeasures and 
investing in home front resilience, at the expense of restructuring military units. The four major 
IDF operations in the Gaza Strip between 2008 and 2014 led to a further erosion in public 
confidence and caused major domestic political changes in Israel. 
Towards a Cyber Defense Paradigm Shift and RMA 
To achieve national cyber security, one must challenge the established defense assumptions 
that have been formed as a result of centuries of war experience promoting particular paradigms 
in strategic defense adaptation. To succeed means a paradigm shift in defense, ie, a revolution in 
military affairs. How can we make this happen? A central finding of theoretical and empirical 
research is that threat awareness and the availability of technology are insufficient to drive an 
RMA. Technology enables the change: it sets the parameters of the possible, but cannot determine 
the exact type, direction and pace of change. Peacetime strategic defense maladaptation often does 
not stem from a lack of technology; rather it occurs because defense organizations are not willing 
to, not forced to, or not able to truly change their ways.  
One of the most serious impediments to effective adaptation is that bureaucracies 
do not exist for the purpose of adapting to a changing and uncertain world. In fact, 
most bureaucracies oppose change, because it represents a direct threat to their 
position. Military bureaucracies proved absolutely necessary for the functioning of 
military institutions, but at the same time they have more often than not proved the 
enemy of innovation in peacetime (Murray, 2011). 
Military disasters are great promoters of defense change, but we would rather avoid this 
route. The civil-military model developed by Posen in the early 1980’s concludes that interwar 
(i.e. “peacetime”) military innovation will only occur if civilian statesmen intervene in the 
development of military service doctrine, preferably with the assistance of maverick officers10 
from within the service (Posen, 1984). Peacetime innovation requires military allies. Other 
researchers (Cote, 1996) have argued that civilian leaders can leverage and "manipulate inter-
service competition to cause doctrinal innovation," i.e. peacetime strategic innovation. However, 
                                                 
9 Ari Shavit interview with former chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon  Sep 14, 2006  Haaretz, https://www.haaretz.com/no-
way-to-go-to-war-1.197210 
10 Officers with unconventional ideas who are willing to cooperate with civilians to reshape the military. 
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outside leaders are unlikely to impose a new vision of future war on a military service that is 
committed to ways of fighting in which it excels. The complexity of modern military bureaucracy 
suggests that one or two vocal visionaries will not penetrate the silos and will not drive revolution 
in military concept and doctrine.  
However, the expectation of military failure assists civilian impact on militaries. A stark 
demonstration of technology or method producing severe damage allows outsiders to challenge 
the relevance of defense expertise. Outside leaders could assist these efforts by supporting 
organizations testing visions of future war, experiments that create, examine and disseminate 
empirical evidence for the need to change. To shed light on successful innovations, I turn to discuss 
Israel's path to the Iron Dome. 
National security: Iron Dome as a defense adaptation success  
Despite the high political cost of military response and the economic/morale damage 
caused by bombardment, the Israel Air Force (IAF) - responsible for air defense - opposed the idea 
that short-range projectiles deserve interception. Then-IDF chief of staff Air Force Major-General 
Halutz said that short-range imprecise and small rockets are not a decisive weapon (Shelah, Limor, 
& Kats, 2007). This was technically correct. The IAF doctrine relied on superior intelligence and 
precision strike capabilities. This not only enables to destroy larger launchers, but also to enhance 
deterrence, including by decapitation. The main arguments against intercepting the rockets were 
that it was strategically unwise, technically impossible11, and prohibitively expensive. 
In the summer of 2006, Hezbollah attacked a military patrol in Israel, killing three and 
abducting two Israeli soldiers. In response, Israel launched a military operation in Lebanon. The 
IAF indeed swiftly destroyed 59 intermediate and long-range missile launchers in the Hezbollah 
arsenal, in a long-planned and well-executed raid (Lambeth, 2011).12 However, as the IDF knew 
well before 2006, the shorter-range rockets that do not require installations could not be neutralized 
from the air. Over the 33 days of the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah fired more than 4,200 
rockets into northern Israel, killing 44 Israelis. The fact that Hezbollah kept up its daily 
bombardment was the main cause of broad popular frustration. A quarter of the short-range 
                                                 
11 Israel already was the most advanced state in active ballistic missile defense (BMD) in the region at least since mid-
1990s, with excellent technical expertise. 
12 http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4827205,00.html  
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Katyusha rockets launched hit urban areas, paralyzing Northern Israel - especially the main port 
of Haifa, refineries and many other strategic installations (Rubin, 2007). The strategic and political 
results of the war were poor, resulting in the removal of the Prime Minister and IDF Chief of Staff 
from office, and a profound political upheaval.  
Despite the Israeli outcry over the IDF's failure to achieve a clear-cut victory (Kober, 
2008), Hezbollah has refrained from launching rockets to Israel for over a decade, which suggests 
deterrence (Sobelman, 2017). However, Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip (that came under 
Hamas control) emulated the rocket strategy.13 Short-range rockets were not a decisive weapon, 
but as Hamas improved its capabilities, more Israeli cities (including Sderot, and later Ashkelon, 
Ashdod and Be’er Sheva) came under persistent rocket attacks from Gaza. These spurred several 
IDF operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.14  
Nevertheless, the IDF and most of the defense establishment continued to hold the doctrine 
of deterrence by punishment and taking the fight to enemy territory. Particularly disconcerting was 
the denial of the need to protect the homeland better. Active defense was not accepted because it 
constituted a strategic doctrinal reversal from offense and deterrence to protection and resilience. 
By 2011, Hamas grew able to launch missiles to Tel Aviv despite two major IDF operations as 
well as leadership decapitations.  
In 2004, then-Brig. Gen. Daniel Gold was named Director of the Ministry of Defense's 
Research and Development department (MAFAT), responsible for overseeing the development of 
new weapons systems. MAFAT has the authority to invest in areas without a requirement by the 
IDF services or arms. Gen. Gold took up the rocket challenge, which the IDF still mostly 
considered as secondary. In 2005, MAFAT put out a request to defense companies to propose anti-
rocket systems, a call that eventually led to the development of the "Iron Dome" concept. In 2007, 
Israel commissioned the development of Iron Dome, choosing the Israeli company Rafael as key 
developer. The IDF did not support the effort.  
                                                 
13 It hardly came as a surprise: fictional “Rockets on Ashkelon power production plant” threat featured in political 
campaigns opposing the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s. The first Hamas-fired Palestinian rocket hit Israel in early 
2001. In 2005, before the Second Lebanon War, Hamas fired 1,200 rockets https://www.idfblog.com/facts-
figures/rocket-attacks-toward-israel/ . 
14 Operation "Hot Winter" launched on February 29, 2008; Operation "Cast Lead" launched on December 27, 2008; 
Operation Pillar of Defense launched on November 14, 2012; and Operation Protective Edge launched on July 7, 
2014. 
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Then-Minister of Defense Amir Peretz was an outsider: the rare civilian defense minister 
with no military background or experience. Peretz is also from Sderot, the southern Israeli town 
that endured high-volume Palestinian rocket fire for many years. In August 2006, Gen. Gold and 
his team briefed the Minister on Iron Dome. After the Second Lebanon War, military experts could 
no longer could dismiss the threat. Those who still could dismiss its significance would think twice 
before telling so to the Minister with a personal experience of seeking shelter in 15 seconds. 
Nonetheless, all military experts slammed the Iron Dome concept, attacking Peretz personally and 
attempting to leverage his lack of defense expertise against him on this concept. However, in early 
2007, Peretz threw his full ministerial weight behind the project, committing another $10 million 
in Ministry of Defense funds to keep the project alive. Peretz did so without military or government 
approval.  
The Iron Dome air defense system went from the drawing board to combat readiness in 
less than four years, placed with the IAF air defense and declared operational in March 2011. It 
has proven combat success in Israel's unique circumstances (Dombrowski, Kelleher, & Auner, 
2013). According to the Israeli Air Force, during the November 2012 seven-day Operation Pillar 
of Defense, Iron Dome made 421 interceptions.On November 17th, after two rockets surprisingly 
targeted Tel Aviv, a battery was deployed in the area. Within hours, the system intercepted a third 
rocket. During the 51 days of Operation Protective Edge in 2014, Palestinian militants in the Gaza 
Strip launched some 4,200 rockets, of which 3,417 landed in open areas, 224 hit urban zones 
including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and 735 were intercepted by Iron Dome (Eilam, 2016). 
The Iron Dome story provides support for the civil-military model of military innovation 
that is missing in today’s adaptations to the homeland cyber threats. The political efforts of the 
civilian Minister of Defense Amir Peretz, in conjunction with Gen. Gold, a strong MoD ally in 
MAFAT who also happened to be an IAF officer, are what made Iron Dome real. Gen. Gold was 
the military visionary champion of change, while Peretz was the rare outsider in the Minister of 
Defense post, a civilian force. Working together, they succeeded in imposing a profound strategic 
change in Israel’s defense strategy, doctrine, force build-up, resource allocation and operations. 
Moreover, despite the obvious value of defending the civilian population against intermittent short-
range rocket barrages, the decision to defend actively was made and implemented against the will 
of the IDF general staff, the IAF air defense leaders, and most security experts.  The fact that the 
Iron Dome active missile defense system was developed and fielded epitomizes successful defense 
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adaptation. It also is a strong example of the difficulties that strategic defense adaptation needs to 
overcome. Future research can use this case to explore the validity of military innovation models 
(Grissom, 2006) 
The civil-military military innovation model argues that peacetime military innovation 
occurs if civilians intervene in military service doctrinal development, preferably with the 
assistance of maverick officers from within the service (Posen, 1984). Both the civilian top-down 
intervention (Peretz) and the military champion of change (Gold) were driving forces in Iron 
Dome. Additionally, the Inter-Service Military Innovation model suggests that more such 
initiatives are to be expected. In pursuit of now-lucrative homeland defense missions against 
lower-intensity threats, land forces, artillery corps and infantry are likely to promote alternative 
tactics and platforms to counter the short-range rocket threat. 
Conclusion 
This analysis spells trouble for the U.S. and its allies. Armed forces, intelligence 
organizations and defense ministries have amassed the most advanced and substantial cyber 
warfare capabilities and capacities. Nevertheless, ministries of defense and armed forces are, at 
best, bystanders in national cyber defense; they only marginally assist in defending homeland 
critical targets. The endgame is that, asforeign adversaries wage cybered conflict inflicting 
significant economic and social toll at the homeland, their appetites and arrogance are growing.  
The Western failure in peacetime strategic defense adaptation – by the armed forces in 
particular – is the underlying cause of this profound strategic anomaly. A direct, destructive cyber-
attack on civilian critical infrastructure violates the fundamental strategic theory guiding every 
sovereign defense. In fact, all branches of armed forces are sticking to their guns, embracing cyber 
technology only for existing missions, and leaving their sovereign defense responsibilities 
unfulfilled in a cybered threat rich world.  
Cybered conflict demands new missions, doctrine and force structure, at the expense of 
older ones. Simply seeking and deploying more sophisticated technology within existing 
organizations will not improve security. Models of defense adaptation stress the importance of 
political and organizational aspects. But maladaptation occurs because defense organizations are 
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either not willing to, not forced to, or not able to change. The role of expertise is significant. 
Generals often uphold a common and dated cyber defense position: armed forces cannot be 
responsible for defending society from cyber-attacks on strategic non-military homeland targets 
by foreign adversaries. They argue that national cybersecurity practices are incompatible with the 
established authority, structure, and ways of practice of armed forces. The expert’s analysis of the 
past ways and established practices of warfighting are taken to be correct. Indeed, a common 
slippery slope argument is that democratic societies should not accept defense at the presumed 
cost of militarization of domestic affairs and erosion of basic freedoms.  
But what if the core capabilities for defending society in cybered conflicts differ from the 
past? Would defense organizations and their experts be able to recognize it, and lead a radical 
adaptation that retires much of their cherished traditions and endangers their expertise? Security 
Studies theory, philosophy of science, and empirical evidence all suggest that profound defense 
adaptation demands external pressure on the expert organization. The recent Iron Dome case study 
shows that civilian outsider pressure and insider champions of change within the military are both 
necessary for strategic adaptation. In both the US and in Israel, insufficient challenge to the 
established paradigm is hindering the necessary development of a cyber RMA. This analysis may 
help military and civilian stakeholders to drastically improve national cyber security instead of 
waiting for the losses of war to force true RMA adaptations. 
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